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CRIMINAL LAW
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A REQUIREMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
LANE V. SUNDERLAND*
In a government of laws, existence of the govern-
ment will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent, teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it
breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the'means-to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine
this Court should resolutely set its face.'
Mr. Justice Brandeis
The public has accepted-largely on faith in the
judiciary-the distasteful results of the Suppression
Doctrine; but the wrath of public opinion may
descend alike on police and judges if we persist in
the view that suppression is a solution. At best it is
a necessary evil and hardly moie than a manifesta-
tion of sterile judicial indignation even in the view
of well motivated and well informed laymen. We
can well ponder whether any community is entitled
to call itself an "organized society" if it can find no
way to solve this problem except by suppression of
truth in the search for truth.2
Mr. Chief.Justice Burger
The juxtaposition of these two statements leads
us to the heart of the controversy between those
who support and those who oppose the exclusion-
ary rule. While some argue that exclusion of un-
constitutionally seized evidence from judicial pro-
ceedings is desirable as a deterrent to unconstitu-
* Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science & In-
ternational Relations, Knox College.
I have been helped in the work of which this article is
a part by Professors Peter Schotten and Richard G.
Stevens. I am also indebted to Donna Palm for her
research assistance.
'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U.L.
REv. 1, 23 (1964).
tional police behavior' or necessary to maintain
judicial integrity, others maintain that the political
order cannot tolerate the freeing of individuals
whose guilt would be clearly established by the
introduction at trial of evidence seized unconsti-
tutionally.4 Do the principles of the Constitution
require the exclusionary rule, or has that rule
become elevated to the status of constitutional law
by virtue of being an often repeated, judicially
created rule of deterrence? If the forms of the
Constitution do require exclusion, must-the rule be
applied to all police violations, no matter how
minor or non-wilful the violations may be? In
addressing these questions, this inquiry first ex-
amines the Supreme Court's explication of the
underlying rationale of the exclusionary rule. It
next presents a theory supporting the exclusionary
rule as a requirement of constitutional principle,
and finally attempts to determine whether or not
the theory requires exclusion in all instances of
police violations, or only substantial violations of
rights related to search and seizure.
I. SELECrED JUDICIAL OPINIONS
The American origins of the exclusionary rule
may be traced to 1886 when Royd v. United States
held unconstitutional the compulsory production
of business papers under the provisions of an Act
of 1874.5 The Act authorized a court of the United
States to require the defendant or claimant in
3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-59 (1961); for a
summary of the most important literature advancing this
argument, see generally Comment, Trends in Legal Com-
mentaiy on the Exclusionamy Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 373
(1974).
4 For a listing of periodical literature supporting this
position, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 426-27 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., appendix to dissenting opinion). Burger
maintained this critical stance toward exclusion in the
context of right to counsel in Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 415-29 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
5 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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revenue cases to produce in court his private books,
invoices and papers. or else the allegations against
the individual would be taken as confessed. Since
the fifth amendment self-incrimination issue was
intertwined with fourth amendment search and
seizure considerations, the dispositive arguments in
the case are difficult to establish. The Court simply
ruled the applicable parts of the statute repugnant
to the fourth and fifth amendments without giving
a more specific explanation of its holding:
IA] compulsory production of the private books and
papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited
in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution: and is the equiv-
alent of a search and seizure, and an unreasonable
search and seizure, within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 6
The peculiarly narrow issue resolved in Boyd might
be interpreted in this way: does the assumption of
guilt which follows from the failure to produce the
private papers involved in the case amount to a
compulsion to testify against oneself? Viewed from
another perspective, this more inclusive issue
emerges from Boyd: must the compelled evidence,
the business papers, be excluded because the de-
fendant had been compelled to incriminate himself
by producing this evidence? It is significant that
the issue of business papers may raise considera-
tions different from evidence such as a murder
weapon. Much of the Court's argument in Bo)d
would seem to apply with greater force to the
former than to the latter type of evidence.
Although the Court in Boyd refused to compel
production of the papers, the particular nature of
the case rendered unnecessary a justification of the
exclusionary rule or an explanation of its underly-
ing rationale as it relates to fourth amendment
issues. It should be emphasized that this was not a
simple search and seizure question. Rather, the
fact that the self-incrimination issue was so preva-
lent in the Court's reasoning, coupled with the
actual wording of the fifth amendment privilege
-"'nor shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself'-made it unnecessar' for the Court to
articulate the rationale underlying exclusion. That
is. the wording of the fifth amendment privilege
relates directly and explicitly to the compulsion of
testinony. In Boyd, the Court saw the foiced pro-
duction of the papers as constituting compulsion
6Id. at 634-35.
to be a witness against oneself, a compulsion which
was complete in nature because of the involvement
of an order by the district judge which constituted
a positive act by the judicial branch of government.
The judicial order and the assumption of guilt
following the failure to produce the papers are
elements which are responsible for the character-
istic fifth amendment cast of the opinion.' Conse-
quently, the actual exclusion of evidence or testi-
mony within the factual context of Boyd seems
more deeply and apparently rooted in the fifth
amendment's ban on an individual's being com-
pelled to testify against himself than in the fourth
amendment's requirements relating to searches and
seizures.8 While fourth amendment searches of a
dwelling may involve an element of compulsion
even when conducted under the guidelines of the
Constitution, the individual is not compelled in the
same sense as was true in Boyd.
The absence of an explicit rationale in Boyd was
largely a result of the peculiar facts in that case.9
Nonetheless, this lack of reasoned support for the
exclusionary rule in Boyd offered little basis for the
development of a coherent and deep-rooted expli-
cation of the doctrine in constitutional law.
Several years after Boyd, exclusion based on
fourth amendment violations was rejected.' 0 But in
1914, in the case of Weeks v. United States, a unani-
mous Court articulated an exclusionary rule based
on fourth amendment considerations and rejected
the common law view that evidence was admissible
however that evidence was acquired." The evi-
dence on the basis of which Weeks was convicted
was seized from his home in two warrantless
searches. This evidence included private papers
like those involved in Boyd.
Weeks presents a more nearly persuasive ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule than that presented in
Boyd:
[T]he duty of giving to it [the fourth amendment]
force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted
under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws. The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions,
the latter often obtained after subjecting accused
Allen further develops the relationship between the
fourth and fifth amendments. Allen, Federahsm and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for 11'o/f 1961 Sup. CT. Ri-V.
1, 29-32.
8 116 U.S. at 633-35.
9 Id. at 621-38.
'o Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (t1904).
" 232 U.S 383 (1914).
(Vol. 69
THE EXCLUSIONAR Y RULE
persons to unwarranted practices destructive of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution, and to which people of all condi-
tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of
such fundamental rights.1
2
The essence of this argument is that all bodies
entrusted with enforcement of the law, including
the judiciary, must enforce that law as written. In
the case of searches and seizures, this enforcement
must be according to the commands of the fourth
amendment. The second thread of the argument
in Weeks is that the courts should not sanction any
departures from the Constitution since the courts
are responsible for supporting the Constitution and
for maintaining fundamental constitutional rights.
This argument is very similar to, although more
explicit than, that made in the later cases which
justify the exclusionary rule on the basis of its being
necessary to maintain "judicial integrity."
13
The emphasis on supporting particular consti-
tutional provisions through judicial insistence on
observing constitutional forms is illustrated in
Weeks, where the Court noted:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles estab-
lished by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the funda-
mental law of the land.'4
Both in this section of the Court's opinion and
in the section quoted earlier, the reason for the
exclusion is not that of deterrence. In the second
excerpt, however, the rationale for exclusion shifts
subtlely from that of "judicial integrity" to that of
preserving the great principles of the "law of the
land." If the government seizes, and admits into
court, evidence obtained in violation of constitu-
tional commands, it is as if the constitutional com-
mands or "fundamental law of the land" did not
exist. While this argument may include objections
2 Id. at 392.
"3 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222-23 (1960),
cited in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"4 232 U.S. at 393.
to judicial involvement in violations of the "fun-
damental law of the land," the Court's reference to
sacrificing "great principles" alsd indicates its con-
cern that if the judiciary does not follow the com-
mands of the Constitution, these principles may
become mere parchment declarations, meaningless
to the fostering of a regime based on republican
liberty. The second section of this article addresses
the significance of Weeks' utilization of the concept
"fundamental law of the land." At this point in the
analysis, it is sufficient to recognize that the genesis
of the exclusionary rule was not explicitly based on
the rationale of deterrence as that term is under-
stood in contemporary usage.
The course of later decisions, however, departed
from the constitutional basis of the exclusionary
rule. Wolf v. Colorado, while a fourteenth amend-
ment decision, raised a question directly relevant
to this departure:
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense
deny the "due process of law" required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence
that was admitted at the trial was obtained under
circumstances which would have rendered it inad-
missible in a prosecution for violation of a federal
law in a court of the United States because there
deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amend-
ment as applied in Weeks v. United States... ?'s
Frankfurter's majority opinion discussed the issue
of applying the exclusionary rule to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in terms of
enforcing the right to privacy which is at the core
of the fourth amendment. He asserted without
persuasive argument that the Weeks exclusionary
rule was "not derived from the explicit require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment.... The decision
was a matter of judicial implication."' 6 He spoke
of various means of enforcing the fourth amend-
ment, only one of which is the exclusionary rule.
Frankfurter later in the opinion stated that
"though we have interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment to forbid the admission of such evidence, a
different question would be presented if Congress
under its legislative powers were to pass a statute
purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine." 7 Frank-
furter's majority opinion does not say explicitly, as
does Black's concurring opinion, that the federal
exclusionary rule is simply a judicially created rule
of evidence.' 8 Frankfurter did not see the Weeks
"5 338 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1949).
'6 d. at 28.
'7 id. at 28-33.
18 Id at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
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opinion or the fourth amendment as clearly re-
quiring the exclusionary rule as a matter of consti-
tutional principle. Unfortunately, no convincing
argument was offered in support of his view.
The case of Mapp v. Ohio'9 provides the most
extended treatment of the exclusionary rule's foun-
dations of any of the cases thus far examined. The
essence of Mapp is that the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of the fourth amendment, and the
right that amendment embodies applies to the
states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Or, as Francis Allen succinctly
stated the case's holding: "the exclusionary rule is
part of the Fourth Amendment; the Fourth
Amendment is part of the Fourteenth; therefore,
the exclusionary rule is part of the Fourteenth." 20
The rationale for the exclusionary rule presented
in Mapp may roughly be divided into two different
categories.2 l The Court cited several earlier cases,
including Weeks . United States, in what appears to
be an argument supporting the exclusionary rule
as a constitutional requirement, independent of its
efficacy as a deterrent. In the context of this dis-
cussion, however, the Court spoke of the exclusion-
ary rule as a "deterrent safeguard." It thereby
prepared the way for a discussion of the "factual
grounds" of deterrence on which Wolf was based,
even though these grounds "are not basically rele-
vant to a decision that the exclusionary rule is an
essential ingredient of the fourth amendment as
the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the
States by the Due Process Clause." 2 Thus, al-
though the Court devoted a significant portion of
its opinion to a discussion of factual considerations
relating to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule, the statements quoted seem to indicate that
these considerations are not the sole or perhaps
even the primary basis of its judgment in Mapp.
At another point in the opinion, the Court em-
barked on a principled defense of the exclusionary
rule on grounds of constitutional principle-
grounds separable from considerations of deter-
rence. 2* This defense is disappointingly ambiguous
and insubstantial, however, and concludes, by cit-
ing Elkins v. United States, that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is "to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effec-
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
a' Allen, %upra note 7, at 26.
2! Finzen, The xiclusiona , Rule in Search and Seizure:
Eramnnaton and Prognosi3. 20 KAN. L. REX%. 768, 770-71
(1972).
S:367 U.S. at 648, 651.
id. at 6-19 56.
tively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it."' Thus, the foundation of this argu-
ment rests on considerations of deterrence. Only
when the Court turns to considerations of "judicial
integrity" does the defense of the exclusionary rule
in terms of constitutional principle become sub-
stantial. The Court speaks of the potential for a
government's being destroyed by its disregard of
the charter of its own existence and of government
as a teacher which, if it breaks the law, may breed
contempt for that law. This principled rationale is
of consequence in Mapp, but it is still not entirely
clear what the Court intends as its primary ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule.2
5
Dallin Oaks succinctly summarized a part of the
difficulty with the Mapp opinion in stating: "The
discursive prevailing opinion in Mapp v. Ohio
quoted the Elkins statement and otherwise charac-
terized the exclusionary rule as a 'deterrent safe-
guard,' but the decision does not clearly identify
the primary basis for the rule because Justice
Black's reliance on a self-incrimination theory split
the majority on this question." 26 That is, Black
adopted a view that evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment must be excluded from the
judicial proceeding because that evidence consti-
tutes a compelled self-incrimination in violation of
the fifth amendment. This doctrine appeared most
vividly in a passage of Boyd v. United States quoted
by Black: "[The Court declared itself] unable to
perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be
a witness against himself."27 Because of Black's
reliance on this doctrine, identification of the pri-
mary basis for the exclusionary rule in Mapp be-
comes extremely difficult.
Absent a clear, persuasive, principled rationale
in Mapp, it is little wonder that the rule should
come under attack from those who object to the
rule's practical consequences. This deficiency in
Mapp also laid the groundwork for the later case of
Linkletter a. Walker,28 in which the Court held that
the Mapp rule did not apply to state court convic-
•_4 364 U.S. 206, 217. cited in 367 U.S. at 656. Oaks
makes a thoughtful argument that the "imperative of
judicial integrity" is a consideration secondary to deter-
rence. Oaks, Studring the Erclu.oonary Rule in Search and
Seitue. 37 U. Citi. L. Ri.v. 665, 669-70 (1970).
2r 367 U.S. at 659-60.
26 Oaks, supra note 24, at 670.
2,7 116 U.S. at 616, 633, quoted in 367 U.S. at 662 (Black,
.J., concurring).
2- 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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tions which had become final before the Court
decided Mapp. Linkletter's seven-Justice majority
rested its opinion on the deterrence rationale: "In
rejecting the Wolf doctrine as to the exclusionary
rule the purpose was to deter the lawless action of
the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth
Amendment. That purpose will not at this late
date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty
victims."' 2 Further, the Court noted:
Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of
the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of
the exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it was
found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless
police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf
requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been
based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to
illegal police action. 
3
With this seven-Justice majority's resting of its
opinion on the policy consideration of deterrence,
the way was cleared for treating the whole matter
of the exclusionary rule not in terms of commands
of consistent and reasoned constitutional principle,
but rather in terms of the practical consideration
of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a deter-
rent.3' Other decisions dealt with retroactivity in a
way similar to that of Linkletter v. Walker. Oaks
Id. at 637.
30 Id at 636-37. Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, joined
by Mr. Justice Douglas, explicitly dissociated himself
from reliance on deterrence as the sole rationale for the
exclusionary rule. Their explicit break from the majority
on this point seems to underscore the majority's reliance
on deterrence as the determinative basis for the decision.
Ia at 648-50 (Black, Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
31 An early empirical study of deterrence cast grave
doubts on the deterrent effect of the rule. Note, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 493, (1952-53). A study supporting the merits
of the exclusionary rule's effectiveness, and based on data
of substance, was published shortly after the decision in
Mapp. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some
"Facts"and "Theories,"53J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 171 (1962).
One widely cited and thorough study is that by Oaks
*which concluded, although the data neither supported
nor refuted the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule,
that the rule was a failure as a deterrent. Oaks, supra note
24. A later empirical study concluded that the exclusion-
ary rule did not deter police misbehavior. Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the ExclusionaV Rule and its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). A study by the
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement during a 27
month period from 1970-72 indicated that appellate
courts nationwide found police conduct in cases of war-
rantless search and seizure to be proper in six of every
seven cases. Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforce-
ment, and the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, as amici curiae in support of the Petitioners at 4,
California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as A.E.L.E. Brief].
summarized the implications of these decisions as
they relate to the rationale of the exclusionary rule:
By fixing the effective date in terms of the police
conduct rather than in terms of the time at which
the trial court took its action in the matter, the
Court has impliedly rejected the theory of "judicial
integrity" and identified the exclusionary rule's pri-
mary purpose as that of controlling police behavior.
Finally, in an opinion concerning the retroactivity
of its decision applying the self-incrimination priv-
ilege to the states, the Supreme Court stated that
deterrence was the "single and distinct" purpose of
the exclusionary rule.s3
Given this clear emphasis on deterrence in the
retroactivity eases and the uncertainty surrounding
the basis of the rule in Mapp, it is not surprising
that the rule has been criticized by members of the
Court. Both Coolidge v. New Hampshiress and Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcoticss presented members of the Court with an
opportunity to critique the rule.
It is not necessary to discuss the somewhat com-
plex factual issues surrounding Coolidge or to ex-
amine the protracted opinions in the case. For our
purposes, it is appropriate merely to note that four
Justices expressed reservations of one type or an-
other regarding the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule as applied in the case through the four-
teenth amendment. Harlan would have perpetu-
ated the rule in federal court but would have
overruled Mapp.35 Justice Blackmun apparently
agreed with Justice Black in the latter's rejection
of the rule based on fourth amendment considera-
tions,36 and ChiefJustice Burger wished the rule to
be revised legislatively.
3 7
The ChiefJustice's most comprehensive and crit-
ical analysis of the exclusionary rule and his pro-
posed alternative were explicated in Bivens. De-
cided the same day as Coolidge, Bivens allowed a
cause of action under the fourth amendment for
damages resulting from a Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics entry and search of petitioner's apartment
and his arrest, all without a warrant.s
Burger began his dissent with a critique of the
judicially created damage remedy, viewing it as an
invasion of the legislative power. He very quickly
3 Oaks, supra note 24, at 670-71.
33403 U.S. 443 (1971).
34403 U.S. 388 (1971).
'5 403 U.S. at 490 (Harlan, J., concurring).
wSa at 510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 496
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
37 Id at 492-93 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
-1 403 U.S. at 388.
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turned to a critique of the exclusionary rule, de-
scribing the rule as having been based on a theory
of deterrence.39 His criticisms of the exclusionary
rule emphasized the high price society pays for the
remedy in that the criminal goes free "'because the'
constable has blundered."'4 Burger also addressed
and dismissed the argument advanced by some
who justify the rule on the grounds that govern-
ment must "'play the game"' by the rules and
"cannot be allowed to profit from its own illegal
acts.... If an effective alternative remedy is avail-
able, concern for official observance of the law does
not require adherence to the exclusionary rule."4
Burger's argument is open to criticism, the most
systematic of which will be presented in Section II.
But it is necessary to recognize here that even
granting the existence of alternative remedies, any
individual convicted in a judicial proceeding in
which the commands of the fourth amendment
have not been followed is convicted outside the
forms of the Constitution. Burger's argument does
not adequately dispose of this objection, nor does
his argument dispose of the objections raised by
the case of Weeks to using unconstitutionally seized
evidence.42
Burger next turned to the argument that "the
relationship between the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment and the fourth amendment
requires the suppression of evidence seized in viola-
tion of the latter. 4 3 Referring to the decisions of
the Court holding that the fifth amendment ap-
plies only to "testimonial disclosures,"4 Burger
stated:
[I]t seems clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause
does not protect a person from the seizure of evi-
dence that is incriminating. It protects a person
only from being the conduit by which the police
acquire evidence. Mr. Justice Holmes put it suc-
cinctly, "A party is privileged from producing the
evidence, but not from its production. ' ' ss
After treating these two theoretical justifications
for the exclusionary rule, Burger rejected them as
39Id. at 411-15.
40 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E.
585, 587, 588 (1926), cited in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 413.
41 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,469,471
(1928) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)).
42 See notes 6-15 supra and accompanying text.
43403 U.S. at 414.
44Id.
4 Id. at 414-15 (citing Johnson v. United States, 228
U.S. 457, 458 (1913)).
the relevant considerations:
It is clear, however, that neither of these theories
undergirds the decided cases in this Court. Rather
the exclusionary rule has rested on the deterrent
rationale-the hope that law enforcement officials
would be deterred from unlawful searches and sei-
zures if the illegally seized, albeit trustworthy, evi-
dence was suppressed often enough and the courts
persistently enough deprived them of any benefits
they might have gained from their illegal conduct."
After asserting that the rule rests on the rationale
of deterrence, Burger turned to his critique of the
exclusionary rule-a rule he regards as both "con-
ceptually sterile" and "practically ineffective."
Generally, his criticisms may be grouped into four
areas. (1) "The rule does not apply any direct
sanction to the individual official whose illegal
conduct results in the exclusion in a criminal trial."
The immediate sanction of the rule affects the
prosecutor. (2) Whatever educational effect the
rule might have in theory is diminished both by
the fact that policemen are not likely to grasp the
technicalities of appellate court opinions and by
the time lag between police action and final judi-
cial disposition. (3) The exclusionary rule has vir-
tually no applicability and no effect in the large
areas of police activity that do not result in criminal
prosecutions. (4) The exclusionary rule is applied
in like manner to both inadvertent errors of judg-
ment and to deliberate and flagrant violations.47
In sum, Burger described the exclusionary rule
as an experimental step in the tradition of the
common law-a step which has turned out to be
unworkable and irrational. As an alternative to the
exclusionary rule, Burger set forth the outlines of
a statute he recommended to Congress, the thrust
of which is the abolition of the exclusionary rule
and the creation of a tribunal to adjudicate claims
and award damages for violations arising under
the fourth amendment or relevant statutes.48
Prior to possible adoption of the alternative set
forth above, Burger supported the narrowing of the
exclusionary rule. Although he did not explicitly
adopt these standards, he cited in an appendix to
his opinion the tentative draft of the American
Law Institute's Model Pre-Arraignment Code. The
thrust of this code is the narrowing of the exclu-
sionary rule so it applies only to substantial viola-
tions, based on considerations such as the impor-




tance of the interest involved, the magnitude and
wilfulness of the violation, the extent of the inva-
sion of privacy, and the potential in the exclusion
for prevention of other violations. 49 Burger did not
give a clear theoretical justification in his opinion
as to why the principles of the Constitution allow
or require the narrowing of the exclusionary rule,
but relied on considerations of deterrence and prac-
tical matters of public policy instead °
Another example of the Court's reliance on the
rationale of deterrence is United States v. Calandra,
5'
which held that a witness testifying before a grand
jury may not refuse to answer questions on the
ground that they are based on evidence obtained
from an unlawful search and seizure. In emphasiz-'
ing the deterrence rationale, the Court denied that
exclusion of the evidence in the context of this case
would have any substantial deterrent effect and
argued that since the witness's privacy had already
been invaded, it would not be further damaged by
the grand jury inquiry. As the Court noted, "In
sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy de-
signed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
erally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved."' 2
More recent examples of the Court's movement
toward deterrence as the sole rationale for exclusion
are five search and seizure decisions handed down
by the Court on July 6, 1976. Although the sub-
49 ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMEN'F PROCE-
DURE 8.02(2), (3) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1971), cited in
403 U.S. at 424-25. Other criteria the draft included are
"whether, but for the violation, the things seized would
have been discovered; and... the extent to which the
violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support
his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in
which the things seized are sought to be offered in
evidence against him."
o Burger cites a number of studies dealing with the
concept of deterrence in an appendix to his dissenting
opinion. 403 U.S. at 426-27. The Chief Justice has more
recently criticized the application of the exclusionary rule
outside the context of the fourth amendment. In Brewer
v. Williams, Burger repeated his assertion that exclusion
is a judicially conceived remedial device and not a per-
sonal constitutional right. In the course of arguing that
the exclusionary rule is not required in all circumstances,
he stated, that an important factor in determining
whether to require exclusion is whether the violation
involved is egregious. 430 U.S. 387, 415-17 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5' 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
52 Id. at 348. For a useful discussion of the significance
of Calandra for future decisions, see generally Barone,
Calandra-the Present Status of the Exclusionary Rule, 4 CAP.
U.L. REV. 95 (1974).
stantive issue of fourth amendment rights involved
in these cases is intrinsically interesting, the com-
ments which follow are limited to the cases' treat-
ment of the exclusionary rule.
Stone v. Powells is the leading case. Stone and a
companion cases held that a state prisoner who
has had an opportunity in state court for full and
fair litigation of fourth amendment claims is not
entitled to federal habeas corpus consideration of
his claim that evidence obtained in an unconsti-
tutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial.s5 Additionally, in United States v. Janiss6 the
Court held that the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule does not forbid the use in a federal civil
proceeding of evidence seized unconstitutionally
but in good faith by a state officer.
These cases reiterate the increased concentration
of the Court on deterrence. In Stone, the Court
stated:
Although our decisions often have alluded to the
"imperative of judicial integrity," ... they demon-
strate the limited role of this justification in the
determination whether to apply the rule in a par-
ticular context.... While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of
the judicial process, this concern has limited force
as a justification for the exclusion of highly proba-
tive evidence.
... Post-Mapp decisions have established that the
rule is not a personal constitutional right. 7
The Court's view of deterrence as the dispositive
issue was made explicit later in the opinion when
it was noted, "There is no reason to believe, how-
ever, that the overall educative effect of the exclu-
sionary rule would be appreciably diminished if
search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in
federal habeas corpus review of state con-
victions.
' '8
The Court's view of deterrence as the primary
criterion justifying exclusion is stressed in Janis as
well. The Court stated, "If, on the other hand, the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable
deterrence, then clearly, its use in the instant situ-
ation is unwarranted."2 9 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that the concept ofjudicial integrity goes no
534 28 U.S. 465 (1976).
ri Wolff v. Rice, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
ss Id. at 481-82.
5 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976).
57 428 U.S. 465, 485-86.
58 Id. at 493.
' 428 U.S. 433, 454.
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further than determining the efficacy of exclusion
as a deterrent in the case being adjudicated.6°
The Court's statement injanis indicates that the
"judicial integrity" consideration has been col-
lapsed into the consideration of "deterrence." This
interpretation completes the transformation of the
exclusionary rule from a doctrine derived, albeit
inadequately, from constitutional principle, to a
rule based on the judges' assessment of the rule as
a deterrent.
This analysis exhibits the shift from the origins
of the exclusionary rule in Boyd 61 and Weeks, 62
which stress intrinsic constitutional principles, to
the retroactivity cases, Calandra6a and the 1976
cases, in which public policy considerations relat-
ing to deterrence appear as the primary, if not the
sole considerations.
It is this writer's opinion that the failure of the
earlier cases to clearly articulate a constitutional
basis for those decisions has led to this drift. In
section II, I will attempt to find such a basis.
II. A THEORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
BASED ON "DUE PROCESS OF LAW"
In the treatment of Boyd, we saw no clear artic-
ulation of the rationale underlying the exclusionary
rule, primarily because of the importance the Court
accorded fifth amendment considerations in that
case.c4 Weeks is more helpful in constructing a
reasoned, principled defense of the exclusionary
rule.65 That case argued that all bodies, including
the judiciary, entrusted with enforcement of the
laws, must enforce that law as written. In the case
of searches and seizures, this enforcement must be
according to the commands of the fourth amend-
60 The primary meaning of '"judicial integrity" in
the context of evidentiary rules is that the courts
must not commit or encourage violations of the
Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area, how-
ever, the evidence is unquestionably accurate, and
the violation is complete by the time the evidence is
presented to the court.... The focus therefore must
be on the question whether the admission of the
evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights. As the Court has noted in recent cases,
this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry
into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent pur-
pose.
428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35.
61 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
62 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
63414 U.S. 338 (1974).
r' For two useful discussions of rationales underlying
the exclusionary rule see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifly States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319 (1962); Mello,
Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 BALT. L. REv. 89 (1974).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
ment.6o This argument takes on added force where
the judiciary is concerned, since courts are respon-
sible for supporting the Constitution and for main-
taining fundamental constitutional rights.
The part of Weeks on which this section of the
paper is most firmly based is this:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land.6
In other words, both courts and their officials
must preserve the principles embodied in the fun-
damental law of the land, including the law of the
Constitution.
Former Chief Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court argued in favor of the exclusionary
rule in a similar manner, stating, "[The argument
against the exclusionary rule] was rejected when
those [fourth amendment] provisions were
adopted. In such cases had the Constitution been
obeyed, the criminal could in no event be con-
victed."
6
Like much of the legal argument supporting
exclusion, both Traynor's insistence that the Con-
stitution be obeyed and Weeks' requirement that
courts be bound by the fundamental law of the
land have an intuitively satisfying ring. Yet, these
opinions do not present a principled and coherent
argument justifying the assertion they contain, that
the Constitution requires the exclusionary. rule.6o
Why would an alternative remedy Which obeyed
the commands of the fourth amendment not be
equally acceptable?"0 None of thejudicial opinions
relating to search and seizure adequately answers
this question-a question raised most clearly by
Mr. Chief Justice Burger in Bivens.
One answer to the question of why an alternative
remedy should not simply replace the exclusionary
rule is that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment arguably requires the exclusionary
66 See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
67 232 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
68 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P.2d 905,
914 (1955).
6 This characterization seems appropriate, for much
of the reasoning contained in the opinions was shown to
be inadequate in terms of supporting the exclusionary
rule.
70 Mr. Chief Justice Burger argues in Bivens that an
alternative remedy would fulfill the demands of main-




rule, at least in certain instances of federal viola-
tions of the fourth amendment. Novelty of inter-
pretation is not a cardinal virtue in constitutional
law. However, as applied to the argument that
follows, that "novelty" is diminished by three fac-
tors: (I) This interpretation has roots in the early
case of Weeks v. United States.71 (2) The argument
supporting the Court's enforcement of the exclu-
sionary rule, as well as much of the scholarly
commentary, is based to a large degree on a kind
of intuition that the Constitution requires the
rule-an intuition which needs supplanting by
persuasive argument. (3) Although not directly
supportable through explicir historical intention or
precedent, the logic of principled construction and
certain cases strongly support the interpretation of
the exclusionary rule set forth below.
The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized? 2
The relevant part of the fifth amendment reads,
"nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law."73 It seems
clear from the very words of the due process clause,
that whatever technical, procedural or substantive
meaning may be attached to the term, it surely
means at least this: the only condition under which
one may be deprived of life, liberty or property is
if that deprivation be in accordance with due
process of law.
Due process of law, of course, is derived from the
phrase "law of the land" in section 29 of the Magna
Carta: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned
or disseized or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor
will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land."7 4 The phrase, "due process of law" first
appeared in 1354 in a statutory reconfirmation of
this section of the Magua Carta, sometimes called
the "Statute of Westminister of the Liberties of
London." According to the interpretation of Rod-
71 232 U.S. at 393.
72 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
73 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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ney Mott:
[Tihe natural inference that the phrases "law of the
land" and "due process of law" were intended to be
synonymous is given additional weight by a direct
implication in a statute issued by the same King
(Henry III) nine years later. With the authority of
Sir Edward Coke behind it, this interpretation has
been very generally accepted, and is now the law in
the United States.
75
That is, Coke in his Second Institutes argued that the
term "by law of the land" was equivalent to "due
process of law."7 6
The equating of due process of law with law of
the land has early, authoritative and continuous
support from the Supreme Court of the United
States as well.7 7 An authoritative and often cited
example of this basis in American law is the case of
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,
where the Court noted, "The words due process of
law, were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words, by the law of the
land."78 It is not surprising, given his equation of
due process of law with the law of the land, that
Justice Curtis identified the Constitution as the
first source of the content of due process of law
when he stated:
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascer-
tain whether this process, enacted by Congress, is
due process? To this the answer must be twofold.
We must examine the constitution itself, to see
whether this process be in conflict with any of its
provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to
those settled usages and modes of proceeding exist-
ing in the common and statute law of England,
before the emigration of our ancestors, and which
are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil
and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country.79
The argument of Mr. Justice Curtis seems emi-
nently sensible. The Constitution is the authorita-
tive legal declaration of the American law of the
land. Thus, when determining what it is that con-
stitutes due process of law or law of the land, one
looks first, as Justice Curtis emphasized, to the
provisions of the Constitution.
Due process of law is, of course, a complex
75 R. MorT-, DUE PROCESS OF LAw 4-5 (1973).
6 CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED 1138, supra note 74,
(citing IIE. COKE INSTITUTES OFTHE LAWOF ENGLAND
50-51 (1641)).
7Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908);
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
78 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
79 Id at 276-77.
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constitutional concept which is open to a number
of interpretations, both substantive and proce-
dural. These interpretations need not be plumbed
in order to make the argument that follows. The
due process clause of the fifth amendment requires
that no person "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'8° This re-
quirement might be paraphrased to say that any
deprivation of life, liberty or property must be in
accordance with the law of the land, or, at the very
least, according to the commands of the authori-
tative legal declaration of the American law of the
land, the Constitution. According to this argument,
the due process clause of the fifth amendment
would allow no deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty except insofar as the commands of the Consti-
tution are followed throughout the proceeding.
Therefore, any deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty violating the fourth amendment search and
seizure provisions would seem to violate the explicit
requirements of the due process clause. That is, as
a matter of constitutional principle, in any pro-
ceeding which may result in the deprivation of life,
liberty or property, evidence or testimony gained
through violation of the fourth amendment (or any
other constitutional provision) may not be used
because the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment prohibits such use, at least in the federal
judiciary.
Contrary to recent trends, the consideration of
deterrence does not assume primary importance
under this interpretation. Rather, the primary con-
sideration is that of obeying the commands of the
Constitution in any proceeding depriving an indi-
vidual of life, liberty or property-a requirement
the due process clause makes explicit and manda-
tory according to the above argument. Why the
exclusionary rule? Simply because the due process
clause requires it, independently of the efficacy of
the rule as a deterrent, or independently of the
comparative efficacy of alternative remedies. Ex-
clusion is a constitutional right emanating from
the due process clause.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
THEORY OF EXCLUSION
Although a number of important difficulties re-
main to be resolved if this justification of the
exclusionary rule as a mandate of the Constitution
is accepted, a comprehensive analysis of each of
these points is beyond the scope of the present
go U.S. CONST. amend. V.
inquiry. However, certain observations and argu-
ments relating to the application of the theory will
follow.
The fact that this theory might be interpreted to
require a perfect criminal proceeding, i.e., a process
in which at each step every major and minor
regulation of criminal procedure is scrupulously
adhered to, constitutes the most evident criticism
which could be made. This criticism is most appro-
priate in the case of a minor police violation of the
fourth amendment which requires suppression of
evidence essential to prove the Government's case
in a criminal proceeding. Although the theory of
the exclusionary rule presented in this paper differs
dramatically from that of Mr. ChiefJustice Burger
in Bivens,8' it may nonetheless satisfy certain of his
legitimate reservations regarding exclusion. One of
the Chief Justice's most persuasive reservations is
that the exclusionary rule applies in like manner to
both inadvertent errors of judgment and to delib-
erate and flagrant violations. Or, as Burger stated,
"honest mistakes have been treated in the same
way as deliberate and flagrant Irvine-type violations
of the Fourth Amendment. ' ' 82 Burger's concern
seems well placed. An important difference exists
between the repeated unlawful entry of a domicile
so as to conceal electronic devices, as in Irvine, and
the merely technical, non-flagrant or otherwise
insubstantial violations which may be presented by
other cases.
83
The relevant question for this inquiry is whether
or not the principled argument supporting the
exclusionary rule presented above allows the ad-
mission of evidence obtained under circumstances
of minor, technical or non-wilful violations. The
answer is arguably yes. One may, in a manner
consistent with the above arguments supporting
the exclusionary rule, specify certain guidelines
limiting application of the rule, guidelines sup-
ported by history, reason and case law.
While it is not possible to survey either the
history or contemporary adjudication of the inclu-
sive and problematic phrase, due process of law or
law of the land, certain observations regarding its
origin and a common sense analysis of its applica-
tion in the theoretical framework explained above
are in order. The very origin of law of the land
occurred in a context in which King John conceded
to the barons the right to trial by their peers
81 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), cited in 403
U.S. at 418.
' 347 U.S. 128 (1953).
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according to the laws of tlie kingdom. According
to Rodney Mott, "the desire to prevent forfeitures
and exactions except by a recognized legal proce-
dure was one of the elements of Magna Carta
chapter thirty-nine as it was sealed at Run-
nymede.'9 In another passage, Mott refers to the
fact that "Itihe protest was rather against the use
of brute force in a flagrant and unusual manner
by the king or the violation of the law by his
subordinates."''
William S. McKechnie described the admoni-
tion that "Injo freeman could be punished except
'in accordance with the law of the land,"' as fol-
lows: "Their [freemen's] persons and property were
protected from the King's arbitrary will by the rule
that execution should be preceded by a judg-
ment-by a judgment of peers-by a judgment
according to the appropriate time-honoured 'test,'
battle, compurgation, or ordeal."' 6 The instructive
aspect of McKechnie's commentary is his emphasis
on the substitution of the King's arbitrary will for
the forms which were honored by time.
George Burton Adams addressed the purpose of
Magna Carta's "law of the land" provision. In his
view, the barons' primary concern was John's ty-
rannical treatment of his vassals without regard for
any process of law. 7 Bruce Lyon also emphasized
the prevention of "arbitrary judgment,". "tyr-
anny," "brute force" and "royal whim" as lying at
the core of this provision of Magna Carta.88
Mott has recorded instances in later English
development of the phrase "law of the land," in
which the questions at issue were those of the
King's power to order arbitrary arrest and the
power ofjudges to keep one so arrested in custody
without probable cause. In examining the Petition
of Right, he emphasized the revival of the idea
"that due process of law granted protection from
arbitrary, extraordinary, or illegal arrests."'8 These
analysts of English history point to a meaning of
due process which requires government to act in
accordance with established legal forms and which
prohibits tyrannical courses of governmental action
violating these forms. It is no novel interpretation
that central to the meaning of due process of law
is the requirement that government be bound by
R. M(lrr, spra note 75, at 3.
Id. at 71 73.
'W. M(:KrcI-INIE., MA;NA CARTA 379 (1914).
8'( . AmAMs, T iIt: ORIG;IN OF Till-: EN;.ISHm CONs..
I t'r ION 272 (1920).
'I. LYON, A CONSITI-'tr I )NAI.ANI) LI II"I'ORY
Ow MDIVAi. FN(;I.-Nl) 312-21 (1960).
' R. Mo.rr upra note 75. at 81.
established legal proceedings. What stands out in
the brief excerpts from these analyses of due process
of law is the degree to which terins like "flagrant,"
"arbitrary," "extraordinary," "royal whim" and
"brute force," are associated with what were re-
garded as violations of law of the land in the early
English history of that concept. While I am not
arguing that due process of law must be frozen in
its early English meaning or that there is no room
for expansion of its meaning, reflection on these
admittedly fragmentary comments regarding the
origins of the concept is useful in making sober
judgments regarding contemporary application of
the doctrine.
More directly applicable to this inquiry is the
meaning of and justification for due process in
American constitutional history. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter saw due process as embodying "a sys-
tem of rights based on moral principles so deeply
embedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our whole history."' 9 An-
other expression of the American equivalent of the
law of the land is that of Snyder v. Massachusetts9'
that a practice or rule is invalid if it "offends some
principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental." Twining v. New jersey'ss2 formulation, "a
fundamental principle of liberty and justice which
inheres in the very idea of free government," Palko
v. Connecticut's9 3 characterization of due process as
requiring those protections "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," and Duncan v. Louisiana's9 rei-
teration of due process as requiring those things
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice"
have a common basis. Each of these statements
emphasizes the profound and non-trivial character
of the protections associated with due process of
law. Like the great English purposes associated
with the origin and development of the law of the
land, these American formulations lead us to a
clearer understanding of the purposes of this great
protection of life, liberty and property and guide
us in contemporary application of due process.
Such guidance indicates that it is the fundamental
character of the right in question which requires it
be included under the protection of due process of
law.
so Solesbee v. Balkcon, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frank-
furterJ., dissenting).
9' 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
9'2211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
9" 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
"4391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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There are certain examples of searches and sei-
zures in American constitutional law which also
emphasize "brute force," "flagrancy," the "extraor-
dinary character" or the "fundamental" nature of
the government official's misconduct. One of these
cases which was decided on the basis of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is
Rochin v. California.9 5 This case had elements of both
illegal search and seizure and self-incrimination.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
disposed of the case on due process grounds. He
emphasized that the judgment was based on the
question of whether "the whole course of the pro-
ceedings" offended "those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of
English speaking peoples." 96 Rochin was convicted
after three officers, who had information he was
selling drugs, entered his house and forced open his
bedroom door. Rochin, who was sitting on the bed
partly dressed, and whose common-law wife was in
bed beside him, seized two capsules which were on
a night stand and put them in his mouth. After an
unsuccessful attempt to extricate the capsules, the
officers took him to a hospital where a doctor
pumped Rochin's stomach and produced the cap-
sules which contained morphine. The capsules were
the chief evidence on which Rochin was convicted
of illegal possession of narcotics.97
The opinion of the Court in Rochin is replete with
descriptions such as "unlawfully assaulting, batter-
ing, torturing and falsely imprisoning the defend-
ant," a "shocking series of violations of constitu-
tional rights," "lawless acts," "physical abuse,"
"conduct that shocks the conscience" and "brutal
conduct."ss One thread of Frankfurter's opinion
for the Court is the character of the police depar-
ture from established constitutional practices.
There is no question that the Court regarded the
violation of constitutional rights as a violation of
an important interest, a major deviation from law-
ful conduct and an extensive invasion of privacy.
A major point of concern for the Court was that
this violation was more than a mere technicality
and that it constituted a side-stepping of estab-
lished forms of police conduct. 99 The nature of the
violation, not merely the fact that there was a
violation of certain forms, required suppression of
the evidence. In other words, the very character of
9' 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
96 Id. at 169.
97 Id. at 166.
'" Id. at 167-72.99 Id. at 172- 73.
due process, according to the implications of Rochin,
requires consideration of the nature of the depar-
ture from the law of the land or the Constitution's
forms in order to determine the necessity for exclu-
sion. The flaunting or flagrant disregard of consti-
tutional forms cannot be a part of the process by
which an individual is deprived of life, liberty or
property.
While Frankfurter's discussion concentrates on
due process of law as requiring the imposition of
"canons of decency and fairness" on the "whole
course of the proceedings" and is not directed
toward the theory advanced in Section II, his
analysis of the police conduct as it relates to due
process of law is instructive."° That analysis illu-
minates the meaning of "due process" as it devel-
oped in American constitutional law and illustrates
an interpretation of and historical authority for the
view that due process of law requires the exclusion-
ary rule but not in response to all police violations
of constitutional requirements. 10
More directly related to the contemporary doc-
trine of exclusion is the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to the states through the fourteenth
amendment which was effected in the case of Mapp
v. Ohio."°2 Although the rationale underlying the
opinion was treated earlier, the specific factual
context of the case deserves comment. Cleveland
police officers forcibly opened a door to Mapp's
residence and denied Mapp's attorney admittance
to the dwelling. A paper, claimed to be a warrant,
was grabbed by Mapp and placed in her bosom.
Officers recovered the piece of paper in the course
of a struggle, handcuffed her and manhandled her.
The officers then conducted a widespread search
of both the upstairs and basement of the dwelling,
including drawers, personal papers and a trunk
containing the obscene materials for which Mapp
was ultimately convicted.
0 3
Although the Court's opinion supports the exclu-
sionary rule in its broad application to various
types of police violations, the particular factual
context out of which Mapp arose is noteworthy.
'°° Id. at 169.
101 The Rochin doctrine of due process of law has, of
course, been supplanted by subsequent interpretations
which have simply incorporated the fourth amendment
and the exclusionary rule through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). It is useful to
reflect on the factual context of Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954), in regard to substantial violations of
constitutional rights; however, the Court did not suppress
the evidence.




The Court's recital of the facts makes clear that the
police conduct involved substantial, wilful and
flagrant violations of constitutional forms in which
there were major deviations from lawful conduct
and extensive invasions of privacy. We see phrases
in the opinion such as "defiance of the law," "high-
handed manner," and "[a policeman] running
roughshod over appellant.""le 4 These characteriza-
tions together with the other actions of the police
described by the Court require exclusion according
to the theory and arguments advanced herein.
That is, the facts of Mapp present an extremely
strong case for exclusion when one compares the
character of the police conduct there to the circum-
stances surrounding English development of law of
the land and to the type of police actions judged to
violate due process of law in Rochin v. Califomia.'m
The police violations in Mapp were wilful, substan-
tial and flagrant in a sense that flaunts the law of
the land and in this regard go to the core of due
process considerations as understood both by the
doctrine of Rochin and by the rationale of the theory
advanced herein.
It is defensible for two reasons to use the example
of Mapp's factual context and holding to support
the theory of due process and exclusion presented
above, despite the -fact that the Court used a
different rationale to support its holding in Mapp.
First, in spite of Professor Allen's accurate descrip-
tion of Mapp's holding,1°6 the case was at bottom
a fourteenth amendment due process clause case.
Second, a fair reading of the Court's opinion in
Mapp suggests the view that, apart from the consid-
eration of deterrence, the flagrancy of the violations
contributed to the way in which the Court disposed
of the case.
One consequence of Mapp.was the creation of a
broad constitutional rule of exclusion applicable to
flagrant police violations such as those presented
in Mapp as well as to much less substantial viola-
tions. The exclusionary rule appears in a different
and more favorable light when applied to suppress
obscene materials in the context of the flagrant
violations of Mapp than it does in the suppression
of needed evidence in a murder case for a minor
police violation. It is unfortunate that this case of
flagrant police violations became the instrument
for requiring the exclusionary rule in all cases when
Mapp lent itself so appropriately to requiring exclu-
sion only in cases of substantial violations of the
fourteenth amendment.
104 Ad.
i05342 U.S. 165 (1952).
106See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
In addition to the formation of a broad consti-
tutional rule in Mapp, there is yet another difficulty
with the decision. Its concentratibn on the criterion
of deterrence seems to obscure treatment of consid-
erations relating to whether or not exclusion is
required as a response to all violations. By shifting
the grounds of the argument to a question of due
process of law or adherence to the law of the land
and away from the policy question of deterrence,
one is better able to adapt or limit that theory on
the basis of constitutional principle.
A brief examination of certain other cases in-
volving the exclusionary rule is extremely useful in
illuminating the qualitative differences between
the type of flagrant police violations described in
Mapp and Rochin and certain other technical, in-
substantial police violations which, nevertheless,
have been held to require exclusion of evidence.
The first of these cases is United States v. Davis,1
0 7
the facts of which are as follows:
FBI agents in a rural area of Alabama arrested
Davis and his son pursuant to warrants charging
them with the unlawful flight to avoid prosecution
for the larceny of an automobile. Before the arrest
procedures were completed, the defendant bolted
from the house. He ran towards his house with the
agents and his son in hot pursuit. He stopped at the
steps, turned, and brandished a .38 calibar [sic]
pistol. In the gunfire that followed, the defendant's
son was wounded. When order was finally restored,
the agents cared for the son until an ambulance
arrived. They then took Davis to Montgomery.
About three and one half hours later the agents
returned to the scene to retrieve Davis' weapon.
Although it was after dark, they discovered the
pistol immediately upon alighting from the car
because of the reflection of the porch light on the
surface of the gun. The gun was recovered from the
yard, and the agents left.
The court held that the entry into the yard
without a warrant was unreasonable.1
8
This search and seizure does not present a case
of a substantial deviation from lawful conduct or
a substantial invasion of privacy. Nor do the facts
of United States v. Davis indicate that the police were
guilty of a wilful violation of the law of the land.
A similar criticism can be made of United States v.
Soriano,b09 where the failure to insert an agent's
name on the search warrant was fatal error al-
though the search was otherwise sound.
'07 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir 1970).'°SId. at 978, quoted in A.E.L.E. Brief, supra note 31, at
29-30.
109 Case No. 72-25-CR-JE (S.D. Fla.).
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On December 23, 1971 a reliable informant ad-
vised agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs that one Anna Betancourt ... was
expecting the delivery of a large quantity of narcot-
ics. Previously, on December 16, 1971, the inform-
ant and Anna Betancourt had purchased a large
amount of milk sugar and Christmas wrapping
which were to be used to cut and wrap the narcotics.
On January 4, 1972, the informant went to the
Betancourt residence and was asked to leave because
narcotics were on the premises. Surveilling agents
then observed a white male and female enter the
house empty-handed and exit a short time later
with a large paper shopping bag. They then drove
to another location, deposited the shopping bag in
a trash receptacle, and drove off. The bag, which
was retrieved by BNDD agents, contained numer-
ous glassine bags and Christmas wrapping paper
which by chemical analysis proved to contain traces
of heroin.
The agents prepared an affidavit which recited
these facts. The affidavit was then presented under
oath to United States Magistrate who issued the
search warrant and handed it to the BNDD agent
who had presented the sworn testimony. Unfortu-
nately, the magistrate had failed to insert the name
of the agent to whom it was directed." 0
The result of this ruling was the suppression of 238
pounds of pure heroin."'
A final example is that of People v. Trudeau:"
12
During an attempted burglary of a vault at a
synagogue in Southfield, Michigan, the night
watchman was killed by blows to his head from a
crowbar. One of the few leads was a heel print left
at the scene. [A few days later] the defendant was
arrested inside a United States Post Office where he
had attempted to break and enter a vault.
Because of the similarity between the two jobs,
the detective assigned to the murder case attended
a preliminary hearing on the Post Office case in
order to view the defendant's shoes. His shoes were
subsequently removed by two police officers without
a warrant and given to the detective." 3
The court held that the removal of the shoes
without a warrant violated the fourth amendment.
The conviction was reversed and the case re-
manded for a new trial." 4
The cases presented here could be dissected at
"
0 Id., quoted in A.E.L.E. Brief supra note 31, at 343-44.
111 Id.
112 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1971).
'" A.E.L.E. Brief, supra note 31, at 28-29.
14 Id. For examples of 13 additional cases involving
suppression for arguably non-substantial violations, see
A.E.L.E. Brief, supra note 31, at 27-38.
great length and the admitted complexity of sub-
tleties of search and seizure could be examined.
This would not appreciably advance or illuminate
the argument being presented, however. For our
purposes, it is appropriate simply to compare these
violations with those of Rochin or Mapp and reflect
on the degree to which they are different in kind.
The substantial and flagrant character of the ex-
treme violations in Rochin, Mapp or Irvine stand in
sharp contrast to the types of violations presented
in People v. Trudeau,"5 United States v. Davis"6 and
United States v. Soriano.'
7
Adoption of the view that the due process clause
prohibits deprivations of life, liberty or property
which are not in accordance with the law of the
land-and, therefore, that the exclusionary rule is
required as a matter of constitutional principle-
raises the question of when exclusion is required. I
suggest that limiting exclusion to instances of sub-
stantial violations of the law of the land or due
process of law is consistent with the theory pre-
sented herein.
In tracing the concept of due process to its origin
in the Magna Carta's law of the land provision, it
was argued that the purpose of requiring adherence
to the law of the land was to avoid "governmental
tyranny," "the use of brute force in a flagrant
manner," "arbitrary will" and "royal whim." The
American judicial interpretations of due process of
law have been based on the "fundamental" char-
acter of the procedure or other right in question.
"Fundamental," "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" or "a fundamental principle of lib-
erty and justice which inheres in the very idea of
free government," suggest ends similar to those the
English concept of law of the land was designed to
achieve. 18 That is, both the English antecedents
and the American formulations emphasize a stan-
dard of governmental conduct necessary to deprive
one of life, liberty or property. Whether this stan-
dard is associated with English history or with
American usage, both indicate that requirements
of governmental conduct are founded in the avoid-
ance of "arbitrary," "flagrant" or "fundamental"
violations of an individual's rights. The types of
violations involved in Davis, Soriano or Trudeau are
not "arbitrary," "flagrant" or "fundamental" in
any meaningful sense of these terms. These insub-
stantial violations, if indeed they be clear violations
1'5 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W. 2d 890 (1971).
116 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1970).
117 Case No. 72-25-CR-JE (S.D. Fla.).
'
8 See notes 85-95 supra and accompany text.
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of the fourth and fourteenth amendments in any
objective sense, do not threaten republican liberty.
Unlike the violations in Rochin, Mapp or Irvine, these
insubstantial violations do not threaten the very
values of political life toward which this great
protection of liberty-due process of law (or law of
the land)-is directed. Exclusion as a requirement
of due process of law need not be extended to
insubstantial violations which do not offend those
great purposes which give the concept of due proc-
ess its fundamental justification.
Impatience with the present law of exclusion
requiring suppression in instances of both substan-
tial and insubstantial violations of fourth and four-
teenth amendment rights need not and should not
lead to rejection of the doctrine in instances such
as those presented by Rochin, Mapp or Irvine. Argu-
ments such as those of Brandeis and Traynor n9
and the opinions of the Court in cases such as
Weeks, Rochin and Mapp are persuasive when viewed
in the context of substantial constitutional viola-
tions; but, they lose their persuasiveness when
viewed in the context of insubstantial violations
illustrated by Davis, Soriano or Trudeau.
We are not without assistance in articulating
standards to aid determination of what constitutes
a substantial violation of constitutional require-
ments relating to search and seizure. The American
Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure,12 cited by Burger in Bivens, 12 1 specifies
criteria for determining substantial violations of
rights relating to search and seizure. Certain of
these criteria, clearly relevant to the argument
advanced in this article, are (a) the extent of devia-
tion from lawful conduct, (b) the extent to which
the violation was wilful, (c) the extent to which
privacy was invaded.iss This is not the appropriate
forum for extended discussion of the several criteria
set forth by the American Law Institute, valuable
commentary about which is contained in the
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure and its
tentative drafts.123 Anyone familiar with criminal
i" See notes 1, 68 supra and accompanying text.
120 ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE.-ARRAIGNMEN' PRO-
CttDURE (1975) [hereinafter cited ALI ConEJ.
12i 403 U.S. at 424-25 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing
ALI MODEL. CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENI PROCEDURE
§§ 8.02(2),(3) at 23-24 (Tentative Draft No. 4) (1971)).
122 ALI Coi)E.supra note 120, at § 290.2.
'23 Other of the Institute's criteria are instructive, al-
though not of the central importance that (a), (b), and
(c) are: (d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to
prevent violations of this code; (e) whether, but for the
violation, the things seized would have been discovered:
(0 the extent to which the violation prejudiced the
and constitutional law is aware that adequate
treatment of even one of the above criteria, that of
wilfulness, for example, would require lengthy
analysis. I utilize these three criteria simply to
moving party's ability to support his motion, or to defend
himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are
sought to be offeried in evidence against him. ALT ConyE,
supra note 120, at § 290.2.
The consideration of deterrence, (d), or the extent to
which exclusion will tend to prevent violations, while it
may be relevant to justifying the requirement that dep-
rivations be in accordance with the law of the land, is
not according to my theory of exclusion, a determinative
factor in the decision to suppress evidence. It was argued
earlier that a constitutional requirement of exclusion rests
on grounds independent of deterrence. Of course unless
the Court rejects deterrence as the primary rationale, the
degree to which exclusion will deter must remain a
primary consideration in decisions to suppress: therefore,
the ALl tailors its recommendations around "what is
constitutionally possible in the present state of the law."
ALl CoDE § 290.2, supra note 120. Developmcnt of my
argument has not been constrained by this consideration.
The difference between present law and my theory is
that the former gives the exclusionary rule much broader
application than is required by the latter.
Criterion (e), whether but for the violation, the things
seized would have been discovered, seems consistent with
the requirements that in any deprivation of lift'. liberty
or property, the forms of the "law of the land" be
followed. If the things seized would have been discovered.
notwithstanding the violation, it is difficult to see the
violation as a part of that process by which the person is
deprived of life, liberty or property. This, of course, does
not mean that such violations should not be punished or
compensated for in some other way, simply because the
theory of due process does not require suppression. For
useful discussion and criticism of amending the Federal
Tort Claims Act, an apparent response to Burger's pro-
posal in Bivens, see generally. Gilligan, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-An Alternative to the Erclusionary Rule? 66 J.
CRIM. L. & C 1 (1975). For discussion of an alternative
of fining the governmental unit employing the errant
police officers, see generally La Prade, An Alternative to the
Erclusionay" Rule 'resentl Admimntered Under the Fourth
..Imendment. 48 CONN. B.J. 100 (197-4). For a helpful st udy
of procedural rule-making. see generally Wilson & Alprin.
Gontrollin. Police Conduct. :36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. -188
(1971). For other useful studies treating rule-making, see
generally K. )AVIS. PoL.c-: I)ISCRtioN ( 1975): Gowa.
Rule-.Makng- and Ihe Police. 70 Nlhc:t. L. RiV. 69 1972.
The point to be made is this: within the framework of
the theory presented above, exclusion is not required if
the things seized would have been discovered even had
the violation not occurred.
Point (f) of the ALI's criteria also merits comment
because it fits into the paper's theory of exclusion. Insofar
as a violation appears to prejudice a party's ability to
support his motion to suppress and thereby interferes
with the party's ability to seek proceedings in accordance
with the law of the land, the theory would require
suppression: suppression would likewise seem to be re-
quired in instances in which violations extensively inter-
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indicate general directions in which the judiciary
might proceed. The abbreviated remarks that fol-
low are included to show the consistency of the
criteria with the theory of exclusion presented
above.
The extent of deviation from lawful conduct,
point (a), is a valid criterion for determining sub-
stantiality. The factual circumstances of Rochin are
just one example of instances in which there was
an extensive deviation from lawful conduct. The
facts of Rochin, including the forced entry, the
violence employed and the forced stomach pump-
ing, contrast sharply with the violation in the case
of People v. Trdeau,'2 where the individual's shoes
were taken during the course of a preliminary
hearing, or that of United States v. Davis,"s in which
a gun used against FBI agents was recovered from
the yard of a house.
Criterion (b) is that of wilfulness. While this
element does not constitute the sole consideration
in determining substantiality, it is a highly signifi-
cant one. Its importance derives both from the
references to English history and American casd
law, where purposeful disregard of established legal
forms-that is, the government officer's intention-
ally overreaching or side-stepping the requirements
of the law-illustrates the most obvious instance of
an official's attempting to become a law unto
himself in defiance of the established law of the
land. The facts as recorded in Rochin v. California
and Mapp v. Ohio seem to illustrate wilful violations
of this type. Once again, they differ sharply from
the cases in which evidence was suppressed as a
result of non-substantial violations.
26
The extent to which privacy is invaded, point
(c), also constitutes a valid criterion by which to
judge substantiality. The degree of the invasion in
Mapp, for example, raises fundamental issues of
privacy. The apparently bogus warrant, the man-
ner in which the officers invaded the privacy of
Miss Mapp's person and the widespread and non-
specific nature of the search contribute to the
fere with the party's ability to defend himself in the
proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be
offered in evidence against him. In the latter instance,
the evidence seized unconstitutionally would seem to
become a significant aspect of the prceedings by which
the individual is deprived of life, liberty or property and
would therefore require suppression under this article's
theory.
124 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 870 (197 1). See notes
112-14 supra and accompanying text.
'25 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1970). See notes 107-08 supra
and accompanying text.
126 See notes 102-07 supra and accompanying text.
substantial character of the violation in Mapp.
These invasions of privacy seem even more exten-
sive when compared with the illustrations of the
minor invasions of privacy in United States v. Davis
127
or People v. Trudeau.lss
While certain of the Institute's criteria are ap-
propriate to the theory set forth in this paper and
help clarify what constitutes a substantial violation
of rights relating to search and seizure, one impor-
tant difference distinguishes their proposal from
the theory espoused herein. The latter theory, un-
like the former proposal, does not require exclusion
in all instances of governmental conduct inter-
preted by the judiciary to be violations of the
Constitution. Examples of cases involving insub-
stantial violations given above exemplify possible
instances in which the theory of this article would
not require suppression.
The Institute's criteria do not, of course, consti-
tute litmus paper tests of exclusion. It is evident
that the three primary criteria must be balanced
in light of some more nearly comprehensive stan-
dard. According to my argument, this standard
consists of those ends toward which the Magna
Carta's law of the land provision was aimed and
which have justified due process in its American
context. Any violation of fundamental liberties,
any action which threatens the principles justifying
our political order, should not be sanctioned by the
judiciary and should not be a part of that process
which deprives an individual of life, liberty or
property. By utilizing the Institute's criteria with
a view toward the historical purposes of due process
of law, the judiciary may achieve two important
objectives. First, the principled objectives of due
process will be served; second, it will be possible to
avoid the present absolute view of exclusion where
the violations involved are insubstantial and the
result supports neither principle nor policy. Some
critics may respond that this approach invites ju-
dicial uncertainty and misapplication. Such criti-
cisms are, however, applicable to the judicial proc-
ess generally and are not sufficient reason for re-
jecting the theory.
The argument made in Section II raises ques-
tions regarding the possible differences between
applying the exclusionary rule through the four-
teenth amendment as that rule involves state pro-
ceedings and the application of the doctrine at the
127 423 F.2d 974. See notes 107-08 supra and accom-
panying text.12t 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 870. See notes 112-14
supra and accompanying text.
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federal level through the search and seizure provi-
sions of tile fourth amendment.12 9 At the federal
level, tile theory presented in this article in support
of the exclusionary rule is as follows: certain types
of violations of the fourth amendment require ex-
clusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence be-
cause of the explicit statement in the fifth amend-
ment that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property unless that deprivation be in
accordance with "due process of law" or "the law
of the land"; following the forms of the "law of the
land" requires that any deprivation of life, liberty
or property must be in accordance with the forms
of the Constitution, or more specifically, in accord-
ance with the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment; evidence seized in substantial violation of
these requirements must be suppressed. At the state
level, the argument for exclusion here presented
applies as follows: the search and seizure provisions
applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment are a part of that law of the land
which binds the actions of the states; no state may
deprive any person of life, liberty or property unless
that deprivation be in accordance with this law of
the land; evidence gained in substantial violation
of these forms must be suppressed. t9
The substantive law of search and seizure is
interpreted by the Court to be identical in regard
to both the state and the federal systems. Since
there is no difference between what the fourth and
fourteenth amendments require relating to search
and seizure, my theory of exclusion would operate
with equal force and be governed by the same
considerations of substantiality in its application at
'29 See Section II supra.
""' The interpretation of due process contained herein
does not necessarily imply a total incorporationist theory
of the due process clause of the fourteeunth amendment.
Since the fifth amendment due process clause relates to
the national government and the fourteenth amendment
due process clause relates to the states, the particular
rights each guarantees to the individual need not be
identical. That is, the rights which are a part of the law
of the land that governs the relationship of the individual
to the national government need not be identical to the
rights that are a part of the law of the land which governs
the relationship of the individual to state governments. It
is not within the scope of this article to treat at length
either the substantive constitutional law of search and
seizure required by the fourth amendment or the prob-
lemnatic theory of incorporation. rhe mandate of the
theory contained herein is simply this: whatever the
content of these rights which are a part of the law of the
land. suhstantial violations of these rights cannot he a
part of the procom by which an individual is deprived of
life, liberty or property.
both the state and federal levels. :' Only substan-
tial constitutional violations as determined by ju-
dicial interpretation would require exclusion. This
theory, of course, runs counter to the proposals of
the American Law Institute's Official Draft of A
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure which
would exclude evidence in any instance of consti-
tutional violations. Examples of relatively minor
violations of the Constitution's search and seizure
provisions were given earlier, and grave doubts
were expressed as to whether or not these cases
warranted suppression under the criteria set forth
to determine substantial violations. 29 These doubts
would hold true in the case of both state and
federal proceedings.
Another possible criticism of my theory of the
exclusionary rule is that, tinder its operation, the
criminal justice system would continue to be dis-
tracted from its primary truth-finding function by
the necessity to determine whether or not police
conduct within a particular factual context consti-
tutes a substantial constitutional violation. There
are at least two responses to this criticism. First,
according to the theory presented herein, because
the very principles of the Constitution require sup-
pression under certain circumstances, the exclu-
sionary rule cannot be viewed as merely a judi-
cially imposed deterrent, justified by considera-
tions of public policy. This position does not, how-
ever, preclude supplementing the exclusionary rule
with other means of enforcing rights against unlaw-
ftil searches and seizures such as those which might
emanate from within the police department itself
or from the appropriate legislative body.' Rather,
the Constitution requires exclusion from a judicial
proceeding of evidence obtained as a result of
substantial violations of constitutional rights, not
a' The standard of reasonablenes is currently thesane
as it relates to search and seizure tinder both the fourth
and fourteenth antendments, but the Court has empha-
sized that the demands of the federal system compel a
distinction between evidence held inadmissible because
of t he Court's supervisory powers over federal courts and
that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United
States Constitution. Differences could conceivably arise
in which conduct would constitute a substantial violation
of the rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions but would not constitute a substantial viola-
tion of fourteenth atnendnent standards. Ker v. Califor-
nia, 374 U.S. 23, 31, 33 (1963).
"r2Al ComI § 290.2 (2), supra note 120. For an
argument similar to the one developed in this paper, see
generally Wright, Aust the Grininal Go Fret if thr Constable
lIunders?, 5 T:x. I. REV. 736 (1972).
"T' See not( 123 supra.
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withstanding the existence of other possible reme-
dies or deterrents.
A second response to the criticism that the theory
espoused would distract the criminal justice system
from its primary function is that articulated by
Judge Henry J. Friendly:
The beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to
deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accom-
plished by a practice, such as that in Scotland,
outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or delib-
erate violation of rights. It is no sufficient objection
that such a rule would require courts to make still
another determination; rather, the recognition of a
penumbral zone where mistake will not call for the
drastic remedy of exclusion would relieve them of
exceedingly difficult decisions whether an officer
overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible
line between a valid arrest or search and an invalid
one. Even if there were an added burden, most
judges would prefer to discharge it than have to
perform the distasteful duty of allowing a dangerous
criminal go free because of a slight and uninten-
tional miscalculation by the police."M
While Judge Friendly's primary consideration in
this passage is deterrence, the thrust of his argu-
ment is applicable to the due process argument
presented herein. "Slight and unintentional mis-
calculation by the police" seems unrelated to the
concern for preserving those great and enduring
constitutional forms which are important to main-
taining the rule of law and civil liberty and to
avoiding tyrannical governmental conduct. While
the exclusionary rule is required as a matter of
principle where both the federal and state govern-
ments are concerned, the rule need not be extended
to all conceivable interpretations the Court may
append to the rather complex law of search and
seizure. The law will undoubtedly continue to
present complex and technical instances of searches
and seizures which beg for legal resolution; how-
ever, it is not clear that any purpose of principle or
policy is served by the exclusion of evidence in
instances of insubstantial violations.'3 5 An argu-
ment might be made in another forum that "the
law of search and seizure should be reduced to a
more manageable set of rules with which law en-
forcement officers can live."' 3 6 It is not necessary
"" Friendly. The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965).
'3 One suggestion of a means to rule on the content of
constitutional rights absent the exclusionary rule is dis-
cussed by Oaks, supra note 24, at 704-06.
'36Friendly, 5upra note 134, at 952 n.l17. Judge
to the argument of this article to resolve that
question, for the considerations relating to the
constitutional necessity for exclusion may rest on a
basis independent from the substantive law of
search and seizure established through the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. That basis is, of
course, the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
It has been argued that the exclusionary rule is
a requirement of constitutional principle in in-
stances in which constitutional rights of search and
seizure are violated in a substantial manner. The
present case law, resting its rationale primarily on
deterrence, has neglected the development of a
principled, constitutional argument. If one accepts
deterrence as the sole criterion for exclusion, it
follows that if exclusion does not deter, the rule
should be abandoned. But, I have argued that the
exclusionary rule has roots in the Constitution itself
and, where substantial violations are concerned,
the exclusionary rule is required, irrespective of the
degree to which that rule may operate as a deter-
rent. While questions of deterrence may support
the argument elaborated thus far, in that they may
constitute a means of habituating government of-
ficers to obey the law of the land, the reasons
supporting the exclusionary rule go beyond this
limited justification. When the exclusionary rule is
limited to substantial violations (those in which the
law should be relatively clear and protective of
important aspects of privacy) it is most easily de-
fended and expresses the sense of the due process
clauses that no person will be deprived of life,
liberty or property unless that deprivation be in
accordance with the law of the land. In this limited
application, the exclusionary rule stands for the
proposition that the law means what its framers
said, and that in instances of substantial violations,
evidence will be suppressed. Viewed from this per-
Friendly and others have suggested the possibility that
the exclusionary rule could be maintained as it is now
enforced if the constitutional law of search and seizure
were made much less complex and reduced to rules more
appropriate to a constitution than to a code of criminal
procedure-rules which would also be more easily com-
prehensible to law enforcement officers. In the event this
suggestion was to become an actuality and the substan-
tive law of search and seizure were more modestly inter-
preted, applying the exclusionary rule to all constitu-
tional violations would be much less subject to criticism.
Given the unlikelihood of such an occurrence, however,
my limiting of exclusion to instances of substantial con-
stitutional violations accomplishes much the same objec-
tive in a manner which remains consistent with the
principles of due process of law.
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spective, the rule becomes more than a
deterrent-it has the potential to reinforce the role
-f the law as a formative, civilizing influence on
the police, the judicial system, the legislature and
the political order as a whole. 3 7 These arguments
apply with great force to substantial violations of
fourth amendment rights. But, it is extremely dif-
ficult to see a parallel between prevention of arbi-
trary governmental action and preservation of fun-
damental rights at the root of due process and the
insubstantial violations of fourth amendment
rights which I would except from exclusion. The
purposes of the rule of law and the requirements of
the law of the land are not served in instances in
which the violations are the result of the impossi-
bility of knowing law which may not be pro-
nounced until years after the search, are non-wilful
and constitute insignificant invasions of privacy.
Exclusion as a requirement of due process of law
need not be extended to insubstantial violations
because they do not offend those great purposes
which give the concept of due process its funda-
mental justification.
The interpretation of due process and the exclu-
sionary rule explicated herein is a part of the more
general argument that the Constitution contains
137See notes 1, 2 supra.
principles and that these principles impose certain
requirements on governmental action, among
which is the command that goVernment be bound
by the law of the land. This principled interpreta-
tion of exclusion will secure the cause of a regime
based on the rule of law and a fundamental law of
the land better than will a mere rule of expeditious
public policy. The former is rooted in the Consti-
tution itself-in a principle which is consistent with
the requirements of criminal justice administration
and the preservation of civil liberty. The latter is
subject to the changing views of'Justices regarding
the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent.
The exclusionary rule, though long a constitutional
doctrine, has not found in the case law an adequate
-theoretical or principled justification. The interpre-
tation contained herein provides such justifica-
tion.ss
138 This article has not addressed the difficult consid-
erations relating to exclusion under other constitutional
provisions, primarily the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment. Treatment of the fifth amendment
question would require systematic treatment of matters
necessitating another extended inquiry. It is appropriate
to add, however, that certain of the arguments presented
herein would apply to fifth amendment violations with
even greater force, since certain fifth amendment viola-
tions may affect the credibility of confessions or other
statements.
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